IGPS Statement 8 Involuntary cancellation of trustee Registration

INSPECTOR-GENERAL PRACTICE STATEMENT 8
INVOLUNTARY CANCELLATION OF TRUSTEE REGISTRATION Released January 2009
Updated 1 February 2013 If you have any comments, suggestions or queries on a matter referred to in this Practice Statement, please contact us on 1300 364 785 or at regulation@itsa.gov.au or by mail addressed to:
Practice Manager – Regulation
Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia
PO Box 10443
Adelaide Street
BRISBANE QLD 4000 Inspector-General Practice Statement 8 – Involuntary cancellation of trustee registration 2 CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION 3
2. OVERVIEW OF BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEES’ DUTIES 3
3. DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS 3
Classification of non-compliance 4
4. DISCIPLINARY AND COMMITTEE PROCESS 5
Legislative basis 5
Committee process 6
The interview process and natural justice 6
5. THE DECISION 7
6. RIGHT OF REVIEW 8 Inspector-General Practice Statement 8 – Involuntary cancellation of trustee registration 3 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1. In the past, courts decided on whether to cancel a trustee’s registration. On 16 December 1996 this became an administrative decision made by a committee convened by the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy.
1.2. This document outlines the process involved when the Inspector-General considers taking steps that may lead to cancellation of the registration of a registered trustee under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act"). This document also outlines the independent committee processes and the basis of the Inspector-General’s decision making. 2. OVERVIEW OF BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEES’ DUTIES 2.1. Registered trustees are required to maintain the utmost professionalism, independence, impartiality, honesty and ethics in their dealings. They are considered officers of the court and, in exercising powers and discretions and making decisions, no lesser standard is to be expected of them than of a court or judge. They play a central role in the administration of estates and are under a general duty to exercise the powers in such a fashion that the objects of the Act, including those of equality between creditors and fairness to bankrupts and debtors, are served.
2.2. Registered trustees also have statutory duties set out in the Act. They have a fundamental duty when administering an estate to carry out certain investigations and undertake certain tasks and functions as set out in section 19 of the Act. Trustees are also required to maintain proper accounts and records, have proper money handling processes and assist the Inspector-General in her investigations when required.
2.3. Registered trustees are also required to comply with the legislative standards set out in Schedule 4A of the Bankruptcy Regulations 1996. 3. DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS 3.1. As described in the Schedule 4A performance standards for trustees, there is an expectation that trustees who, without reasonable explanation, regularly fail to comply with the Act and Regulations, who diverge from acceptable standards of practice or whose behaviour or conduct brings the integrity of the insolvency system into disrepute will be subject to disciplinary action.
3.2. Disciplinary action may be taken where a breach of the Act or a performance standard is identified. In deciding what action is appropriate, ITSA Regulation takes into account:
a. the nature of the breach
b. the seriousness of the effect of a failure to comply, including the impact on a particular estate or individual
c. a trustee's performance history and whether the trustee has previously failed to comply when able to. Inspector-General Practice Statement 8 – Involuntary cancellation of trustee registration 4 3.3. There is a range of sanctions or actions which Bankruptcy Regulation can take when it considers breaches of duty or non-compliance have occurred. Involuntary cancellation of registration is generally a sanction of last resort. Sanctions that Bankruptcy Regulation may consider prior to initiating action to de-register a trustee include:
a. education – making trustees aware of problem areas and the correct practice or law individually and collectively
b. individual counselling – by far the most effective means to achieve timely remedial action
c. changing in the risk classification of a trustee. This will lead to a larger sample of files being selected for future annual inspections and a more detailed inspection being undertaken, particularly in areas of prior non-compliance
d. formal investigation and reporting under section 12 of the Act. Such reports may be supplied to creditors, police and other regulator or disciplinary bodies such as ICAA, CPA or Law Councils and Societies
e. audit of a trustees accounts under section 175 of the Act
f. imposition of penalties for realisations and interest charge breaches
g. issue of "show cause" letters requiring a trustee to explain both their actions and why they should continue to be registered
h. referral to other investigation units or law enforcement bodies. Classification of non-compliance 3.3. ITSA Regulation utilises a classification system to describe areas of non-compliance and assist it to decide on the appropriate action to take subject to the seriousness and impact. Category A Fundamental breaches and lack of controls that are likely to bring into question the integrity of the system. This includes cases where there are repeat non-compliance occurrences of Category B type previously identified and reported on.
These matters will give rise to either legal action, referral to fraud investigators or section 155H action concerning deregistration. Category B Serious and systemic issues that will have a material impact on the administration and require timely action.
In these cases the trustee will be counselled and timely remedial action is expected to be taken. Failure to take timely remedial action will give rise to reclassification to a Category A and appropriate action. Category C One-off practice or procedural non-compliance is not systemic and doesn’t have a significant impact on the administration, dividends or creditors, debtors’ rights or system integrity but should be brought to the attention of the trustee.
Further identification of errors of this nature through complaints or later inspections would see the escalation of the error to a Category B and counselling of the trustee. Inspector-General Practice Statement 8 – Involuntary cancellation of trustee registration 5 3.4. This provides a structured process that will see the escalation of a matter if it is not resolved by the trustee. Most matters are resolved quickly and amicably upon intervention by ITSA Regulation.
3.5. Hence breaches or non-compliance with the Act or a performance standard may give rise to a simple query by ITSA Regulation on the reasons why there has been a deviation and where repetitive breaches occur or, in the case of a serious breach, result in action to cancel a trustee’s registration. 4. DISCIPLINARY AND COMMITTEE PROCESS 4.1. Usually a trustee will be well informed of issues of concern raised by ITSA Regulation, as delegate for the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy, during investigations or inspections and will have been provided the opportunity to state their position. Legislative basis 4.2. Section 155H provides that the Inspector-General may ask a registered trustee to give the Inspector-General a written explanation why the trustee should continue to be registered, if the Inspector-General believes that: "(a) the trustee no longer has a qualification or ability that is prescribed by the regulations made for the purposes of paragraph 155A(2)(a); or
(aa) the trustee no longer has the ability (including knowledge) to perform satisfactorily the duties of a registered trustee; or
(b) the trustee has been convicted of an offence involving fraud or dishonesty since registration as a trustee; or
(c) the trustee is not insured against liabilities that the trustee may incur, or has incurred, working as a registered trustee; or
(d) the trustee is no longer practising as a registered trustee; or
(e) the trustee has contravened any conditions imposed by the committee on the trustee’s practice; or
(f) the trustee has failed to exercise powers of a registered trustee properly or has failed to carry out the duties of a registered trustee properly; or
(fa) if the trustee is or was the administrator of a debt agreement—the trustee has failed to properly carry out the duties of an administrator in relation to a debt agreement; or
(g) the trustee has failed to comply with a standard prescribed for the purposes of subsection (5)." 4.3. If ITSA Regulation, as delegate of the Inspector-General, then forms the belief that a ground set out in section 155H is established and other sanctions are either inappropriate or have had no positive effect, Regulation will formally write to the trustee outlining the breaches in detail, seeking the trustee’s formal response as to why their registration should not be cancelled. The trustee is given 28 days to respond in writing.
4.4. If the Inspector-General or delegate does not receive an explanation within a reasonable time, or is not satisfied by the explanation, the Inspector-General or delegate must convene a committee to consider whether the trustee should continue to be registered. Inspector-General Practice Statement 8 – Involuntary cancellation of trustee registration 6 Committee process 4.5. The committee must consist of the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy or delegate, an officer of the Australian Public Service ("APS") and a registered trustee, registered for more than five years, nominated by the Insolvency Practitioners Association ("IPA"). To ensure impartiality no delegate involved in decisions to this point will act as delegate of the Inspector-General on the committee.
4.6. The committee is required to make inquiries that are reasonable for the purpose of making an informed decision or that the chairperson believes are appropriate in order for the committee to have sufficient information to make the decision.
4.7. A committee must observe natural justice. This is explained in more detail below.
4.8. A committee is not bound by any rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter as it sees fit. This means that the committee will not hear submissions on whether information provided is admissible in a court of law or not. Similarly there is no right of "objection" to the questions being asked by the committee. Questions will be asked of the trustee and the trustee can choose either to answer or not. The committee may proceed with its consideration of the matter irrespective of any refusal to answer.
4.9. Whilst it will usually consider all the supporting documents that formed the basis of ITSA Regulation’s decisions and the trustee’s responses, the committee is not limited to just that information or the information that formed the basis of the prior decision to issue a show cause letter. The committee can consider any information and form its own view in the matter.
4.10. The committee will interview the trustee. Details of the interview process are provided below.
4.11. Once the committee has considered all the information it needs it will decide firstly whether there was a breach set out in section 155H, and if so whether that breach or breaches were serious enough to either impose conditions on the registration or to cancel the trustee’s registration.
4.12. It must provide reasons for its decision to both the trustee and the Inspector-General. The Inspector-General must accept the committee’s decision and give effect to the decision.
4.13. Pursuant to regulation 8.32, a committee must take all reasonable measures to protect from unauthorised use or disclosure information given to it in confidence in, or in connection with the performance of its functions or the exercise of its powers. The interview process and natural justice 4.14. Once the Inspector-General or delegate has determined the makeup of the committee, the committee will convene to consider the matter. The date of convening will usually be the first time the committee meets and as timeframes commence from this date, the trustee will be advised. Inspector-General Practice Statement 8 – Involuntary cancellation of trustee registration 7 4.15. The interview date, time and place will be arranged to meet the needs of the committee and the trustee.
4.16. Should the trustee fail to attend the interview and fail to give a reasonable excuse for non-attendance within seven days, the committee may proceed with its consideration of the matter. If a reasonable excuse for failure to attend is provided within seven days, the committee must arrange another interview date, time and place.
4.17. The trustee may choose to have legal representation at any point in the process.
4.18. The interview is an inquisitorial process, not an adversarial one. The process is both to provide the trustee with an opportunity to further rebut or comment on the issues raised previously by the ITSA Regulation delegate and to allow the committee to seek clarification on issues and ask questions concerning the administrations and practices.
4.19. The trustee may make submissions both on the issue of the prior delegates decision concerning breaches set out in subsection 155H(1) of the Act and on appropriate sanctions that should be imposed by the committee, in the event that the committee also finds breaches occurred.
4.20. Time will be allowed for such submissions and the trustee may introduce any further information either in writing or orally and this includes any other parties who would like to put submissions on the trustee’s behalf. The trustee should advise the committee prior to the interview if there are any other people s/he wishes to call to put information to the committee at that time.
4.21. Usually prior to the interview, the trustee will be provided with all the information the committee has been provided with and may rely upon, to allow the trustee to prepare a response. However, as some information may not become available until the interview or afterwards this will not always be possible.
4.22. The committee will before making its decision provide advice on the information it will rely upon and provide any subsequent information to the trustee obtained during or after interview and allow a reasonable time for the trustee to consider and respond.
4.23. Should assertions be made as to the character of the trustee by any party and the assertions form part of the information on which the committee will rely, the trustee will have a right under natural justice principles to cross examine the person who made the assertion. 5. THE DECISION 5.1. The committee is required to keep minutes recording their meetings and decisions made and must make a decision within 60 days of first convening, which is usually the day of the interview. Inspector-General Practice Statement 8 – Involuntary cancellation of trustee registration 8 5.2. The committee has 14 days from the date of reaching a decision to provide a report of its decision to the trustee and the Inspector-General.
5.3. The committee has three decision options:  cancel the trustee’s registration  allow the trustee to remain registered unconditionally  allow the trustee to remain registered but with conditions imposed. 5.4. It is important to note that the decision on whether to remove a trustee’s registration lies with the committee and not the Inspector-General. The committee decision is also independent to ITSA Regulation’s investigations and decisions.
5.5. The courts have historically held trustees’ registrations in high regard and have been reluctant to de-register trustees unless the most serious breaches have occurred. Committees, whose decisions are reviewable in the AAT, will consider any legal precedents which may provide guidance, in arriving at their decision.
5.6. Committees cannot suspend a trustee’s registration. However, a conditional registration could be made where the trustee remains registered but may be restricted from practicing for a certain period or restricted in some other way.
5.7. The committee report, to be provided to the trustee and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy within 14 days of reaching its decision, will outline the basis of the decision, detail the issues considered and the information and law relied upon.
5.8. If the decision is to cancel registration, the trustee will be required to return their certificate of registration unless they have a reasonable excuse not to do so. The trustee will not be entitled to a refund of all or part of any registration fee that has been paid. The trustee would not be entitled to re-apply for registration for a period of 10 years.
5.9. The Inspector-General is required by law to record the cancellation of the trustee’s registration on the National Personal Insolvency Index, a publicly-accessible database. The Inspector-General is also required to report to Parliament on activities under the Bankruptcy Act. This means that, while the decision in detail is not made publically available, the name of the trustee whose registration has been cancelled will be made public as will the general nature of the breaches involved.
6. RIGHT OF REVIEW 6.1. If the trustee is dissatisfied with the committee’s decision, they may appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the AAT"). An application to the AAT for a review of the committee’s decision must be in writing, set out the reasons for the application and must be made within 28 days of the date the committee’s report is received by the trustee. Full information about applications to the AAT can be obtained from the local AAT Registry or from the internet at www.aat.gov.au.

- ACN 079 638 501 Pty Ltd v Pattison

 This is the corrupt trustee Paul Pattison that was protected by Veronique Ingram and senior management at ITSA
Up one level

- who owns the WIP.

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Summary

An insolvency practice was operated through a company controlled by an insolvency practitioner. The Court made a finding that because of the particular arrangements between the company and the practitioner the work in progress was an asset belonging to the company. Accordingly, the court made a declaration that on the facts in this case work in progress is an asset of the Company. As the company had charged its assets in favour of a bank and the bank had appointed a Receiver the charge was enforceable by that Receiver.

Facts:

Mr Pattison operated his practice through the Company. The time spent by Mr Pattison was included in the Company’s invoice and no separate charge was made by Mr Pattison personally. Wages were payable to Mr Pattison as an employee. The Company had charged its assets in favour of the Bank of Western Australia (‘Bankwest’).

As part of the process of placing the Company into a members’ voluntary liquidation in April 2010 Mr Pattison’s declaration on solvency included the work in progress as an asset of the company and valued at $4.1million (as against $6.3 million recorded – the reduction based on his assessment of what could realistically be recovered).
Issue: Was the work in progress an asset of the Company, and hence subject to the Bankwest charge, or the property of Mr Pattison?

Decision:

The court considered the real question was the relationship between Mr Pattison and the Company and the effect that had on the ownership of the work in progress. Ferguson J accepted that:

There is no doubt that Mr Pattison had certain obligations arising from the appointment of him personally as liquidator, administrator or trustee in bankruptcy. However, that is not determinative of the ownership of the work in progress as between Mr Pattison and the Company.
The Court turned to consider whether Mr Pattison was an employee of the Company as the Receivers contended. Mr Pattison argued on the other hand the Company provided services to him and the arrangements for reimbursement could be terminated by him at any time without notice or penalty, presumably with the effect that any amounts due for work in progress reverted to him and were due to him as a personal liability. He referred to s165(1)(b) in support of this proposition, as this provision prohibits a trustee making an arrangement to give up a part of remuneration due to the trustee to any other person.
Citing Re Dare (1992) 38 FCR 356 for the proposition that being an employee is not necessarily incompatible with being registered as a trustee in bankruptcy, the court endorsed the proposition that what is of primary importance is whether the employee when acting as a trustee would enjoy ‘independence from external control’.
The Court noted that the fact that nothing prevented Mr Pattison from being an employee and at the same time accepting appointments, and nor did being a director of the Company prevent him from also being an employee of the Company.
In finding Mr Pattison was an employee Ferguson J took the following indicia into account:

i. The Company's books recorded Mr Pattison as an employee

ii. The work he performed went beyond which a Director would perform

iii. That work was recorded as work of the Company

iv. There was no separate work that was performed on the administrations that was recorded separately or for which a separate charge was made by him

v. The full amount of the fees charged was paid to the Company

vi. Mr Pattison did not seem to deduct any amount or receive payment of any part of the fees before the payment was made to the Company.

vii. Mr Pattison received from the Company amounts for that work that replicated wages rather than payment of the hourly fees charged for his time working on the administrations.

viii. The Company’s ownership of the work in progress was made clear in his Declaration in April 2010, which was consistent with his status as an employee, and the fiduciary duties not to profit from their position as director or employee at the expense of the Company, and to account for property received on behalf of the Company employer.

The court rejected the submission that the payments to the Company were reimbursement for services provided and instead concluded that Mr Pattison was ‘merely a conduit for payment for the money to the Company’.
The Court went on to hold that the work performed by Mr Pattison was an asset of the Company, the ‘time records’ being ‘akin to an inventory record for stock’. It only remained for the court to confirm that the charging provision was broad enough to capture the work in progress and that it was therefore enforceable by the Receivers appointed by Bankwest.
Note: Appeal application lodged in the Victorian Supreme Court decision by Mr Pattison - no hearing date has been advised yet.

Gainsford v Tannenbaum / \federal Court

- Gainsford v Tannenbaum

Up one level

[2012] FCA 904. Cross –Border Insolvency considered.

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Summary

In this decision, the court declined an application pursuant to the Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) for orders to assist the South African trustees of Mr Tannenbaum’s bankrupt estate on the basis that South Africa was not the ‘centre of the debtor’s main interests’. It held that his ‘habitual residence’ had changed from South Africa to Australia. This disqualified the South African proceedings from being ‘foreign main proceedings’. However, the court made similar orders to those sought but under s.29 of the Bankruptcy Act to assist the trustees’ information gathering and investigative activities.

Facts

The applicants, who were the South African trustees of Mr Tannenbaum’s bankrupt estate, were investigating a scheme operated between 2004 and 2009 by Mr Tannenbaum in South Africa under which he had received AUD390m, of which some USD31.7m had been transferred to an Australian company.
Some USD14m had been transferred from that company to other entities controlled by Mr Tannenbaum or his associates. Mr Tannenbaum left South Africa for Australia in mid-2007. The applicants were seeking orders to assist in their inquiries as they were concerned that Mr Tannenbaum’s failure to co-operate was hampering their administration of his insolvent estate.

The trustee’s extensive investigations had included the examination of some 200 witnesses over 37 days in South Africa and the institution of some 90 High Court proceedings in South Africa under voidable disposition provisions (the applicants noted the earliest trial listing was not until 2017).　

Issues

The Court had to determine whether the South African proceedings satisfied the conditions specified in the Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (‘CBIA’).

Decision

The Court began by distinguishing the CBIA’s status based criteria from its procedural criteria. The Court was satisfied as to the status based conditions-precedent:

1. The South African proceeding was a ‘foreign proceeding’
2. The applicants were ‘foreign representatives’, and
3. The Australian court was a court of competent jurisdiction

Likewise, the Court was satisfied as to the procedural conditions precedent. The application was accompanied by:

1. the necessary certificates constituting the presumptive proofs provided for in the CBIA, and statements from the applicants identifying any other proceedings (none in this instance)
2. A supporting statement canvassing relevant Australian proceedings or appointments, and
3. An interim application seeking directions as to service

However, the court found a major problem when turning to the substantive criterion relating to the recognition of a foreign proceeding. As noted above, with Mr Tannenbaum having been living in Australia since 2007 and essentially having severed all ties with South Africa, could South Africa, in the terms of the Model Law, be the ‘centre of the debtor’s main interests’ (COMI)?
To answer this question the court had to examine the concept of ‘habitual residence’, because in the case of an individual this is posited as the presumptive COMI. And so it asked ‘where is Mr Tannenbaum’s place of habitual residence and is there proof that his COMI is other than at this place?" (para 35). The Court’s approach was informed by the judgment of Heath J in Williams v Simpson [2011] 2 NZLR 380. In that case the Court applied the jurisprudence arising in the context of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction. That Convention had wrestled for many decades with the notion of the habitual residence of the child (and parents).
Accordingly, Logan J turned to the leading Australian authority LK v Director-General, DOCS (2009) 237 CLR 582. The High Court pointed in the direction of ‘the ordinary meaning of the composite expression’ which, it stated, is to be regarded as a question of fact. The High Court accepted that "[h]abitual residence, consistent with the purpose of its use, identifies the center of a person’s personal and family life as disclosed by the facts of the individual’s activities" (para 25).
On this basis Logan J held that Mr Tannenbaum was not habitually resident in South Africa and ‘that at the very latest, if not already by 2009, he was habitually resident in Australia as at the time this application was filed and remains so’ (para 43 – emphasis added). The Court found the presumption was not rebutted. Hence, the court was compelled to dismiss the application insofar as it sought recognition of the South African proceedings as a foreign main proceeding. Moreover, the court rejected an argument for recognition as a foreign non-main proceeding as after 2009 all Mr Tannenbaum’s business operations in South Africa ceased and there was no present ‘establishment’ in South Africa as required by the CBIA.
Aware that this was a somewhat quixotic outcome the Court noted at para 53:
The circumstances of the present case may well highlight a deficiency or at least a gap in the Model Law in relation to individual debtors. Particularly in a case where large amounts have been raised from creditors and retained by the borrower … the incentive for a debtor to quit the jurisdiction may be a strong one. A lag might then occur between when the absence of the debtor and the funds is detected and when proceedings for insolvency are taken and a sequestration order is made. … By the time that a debtor is made insolvent in one jurisdiction and Model Law recognition proceedings commenced in another, the debtor may have established habitual residence in that other jurisdiction.
However relief was granted to the applicants under their alternative claim for relief based on s.29 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Taking an expansive view of this ‘judicial comity’ provision the court looked past the fact that South Africa was not a ‘prescribed country’ for the purposes of s.29, and, invoking the ‘ideal of universality of application with respect to bankruptcy proceedings’ the Court made orders compelling Mr Tannenbaum’s provision of a Statement of Affairs and his examination, by way of assistance to the SA High Court and that court’s appointees.

Weedon V Rambaldi/ Federal Magistrates court

10. Weeden v Rambaldi [2012] FCA 552

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SummaryIn this decision, which is the subject of an appeal, Bromberg J had to consider who was appointed Mr Weeden’s trustee at a creditors’ meeting. At issue was whether either a sole trustee, or joint trustees, had been appointed. That decision would in turn determine the validity of a number of different Notices subsequently filed and, it was argued, made pursuant to the Act by only one of the two trustees in question.
The Court conducted a forensic examination of the circumstances and documentation relating to the meeting before concluding that creditors had appointed a sole trustee, not joint trustees. Accordingly, the Notices the sole trustee had filed and issued were held to be valid. The application was dismissed.
Facts Mr Turner was originally the trustee. At a meeting of creditors, the minutes recorded a resolution as being passed appointing Mr Rambaldi and Mr Yeo as joint trustees in place of Mr Turner.
Following that meeting in a Notice of Objection to Discharge Mr Yeo described himself as the ‘Trustee’. In a later Notice of Objection to Discharge Mr Yeo described himself as a ‘Joint and Several Trustee’. Between 2007 and 2011 Income Assessments addressed to the bankrupt were signed by Mr Yeo as “Joint & Several Trustee”.
Issue The Court had to determine who was appointed to replace the former trustee, Mr Turner. To this end it was necessary to consider whether at a creditors’ meeting Mr Yeo and Mr Rambaldi were jointly appointed as trustees to replace Mr Turner, or whether Mr Yeo was appointed as the sole trustee. Depending on that determination the validity of Notices relating to Mr Weeden’s bankruptcy then fell to be considered.
The validity of the Notices turned on this point because, as is suggested by the description ‘joint trustees’, any power exercised under the Act will only be validly exercised with the ‘unanimous concurrence’ of each joint trustee. In contrast, and not claimed in the instant matter, if trustees were appointed jointly and severally any or all of them may act. No such issues arise with respect to the Notices in the case of a sole trustee.
DecisionThe Court began by outlining the recognised tripartite classification of trustees: sole, joint, or joint and several. His Honour then posed the two propositions that the applicant had to establish to succeed as being:
1. There was an appointment as joint trustees
2. If it was a joint appointment, the making and filing of Notices were not done with the concurrence of the other Trustee.
As to the first proposition Bromberg J noted the presumption in section 257 of the Act that minutes are prima facie evidence of proceedings at creditors’ meetings. Here the minutes referred to Mr Rambaldi and Mr Yeo as being appointed as joint trustees. However, the Court was satisfied that this was rebutted by other evidence. In particular extrinsic documentation supported the conclusion that Mr Yeo was validly appointed as sole trustee.
This other evidence included having regard to the standard practice of three people present at the meeting. This was taken to likely be a good guide to actual practice. In addition contemporaneous records in the form of handwritten notes and a ‘running sheet’ were scrutinised. It was noted that the minutes were not finalised until three days after the meeting. Finally the inherent disincentives associated with a joint appointment were held to support a conclusion that the joint trustee arrangement was unlikely without there being some good reason being evident. On this basis His Honour was satisfied that the minutes were not a reliable and accurate record of the resolution. Rather it was held that Mr Yeo was validly appointed as the sole trustee and hence the impugned Notices were valid.

An order was also made to amend the National Personal Insolvency Index maintained by ITSA, to record Mr Yeo as the trustee of Mr Weeden’s estate.

While it was unnecessary to decide the second proposition noted above, Bromberg J observed that the evidence fell well short of showing concurrence by Mr Rambaldi.
Likewise the possible application of subsection 306(1) also did not fall to be decided, this only being relevant if a joint appointment had been found. However Bromberg J indicated that he would have rejected its operation on the basis that acts required to be done by ‘the trustee’ with respect to the Notices went beyond a ‘formal defect or irregularity’.
Citing the High Court decision of Adams v Lambert (2006) 228 CLR 409, His Honour construed the exercise of a trustee’s or trustees’ powers relating to the Notices in question as being beyond the remedial scope of subsection 306(1), concluding that the nature of such powers suggested validation by the operation of subsection 306(1) was not intended, such that ‘the validity of an act effectuated by a trustee or trustees at the time the act was effectuated, [is considered] to be an “essential” requirement, the absence of which is not capable of validation by s306(1)”[emphasis added].
The application was dismissed with costs to be determined.
A Notice of Appeal has been filed.

ITSA's FOI

Public Servants baulk at FOI changes

Hawke submissions and who knows what they are talking about? Posted: 25 Feb 2013 12:16 PM PST Attitudes and culture within government agencies regarding openness and transparency as reflected in submissions to the Hawke Freedom of information review was an issue also picked up in Stephanie Peatling's article in Fairfax Media yesterday: Public servants baulk at FOI changes.  "The public service is revolting against reforms" are the reporter's words not mine but I admit to the following contributions to Peatling's report, along the lines of my brief summary in a recent post.  'The first word that comes to mind is blowback,'' lawyer and FOI expert Peter Timmins said. ''The general thrust of most of them is to bring into question the reforms of 2010.''.... Mr Timmins said many members of the public service still tried to keep information from being released for fear of the political fallout.  ''There are still decisions that err on the side of excessive secrecy,'' Mr Timmins said. ''There's a perspective that all this [the reforms] has gone too far.'' The article attracted comments on-line including this from Eudaimonia of Kingston who really knows how to hurt a guy:  I doubt if Mr Timmins and his ilk really know much about the FOI Act. I was involved with FOI as a practitioner for 19 years from its inception in Dec '82. For some strange reason, some applicants delude themselves that they will get more mileage out of their request by making it through a lawyer. It couldn't be farther from the truth. Primarily, lawyers, due to the sterile nature of their training. invariably have no concept of ''the spirit of the Act'', which is enshrined in s3 (I think). It was unique to FOI in 1982. Essentially, it says that if there's no good reason for refusing access, then the document should be released. Moreover, the average lawyer may have spent a few lectures and tutorials on FOI in the entire course of his/her training. Upon being hired by the applicant, they pull out their copy of the Act and have a read of it, probably for the first time in some cases. Often their copy of the Act is out-of-date. I once was contacted by a QC on behalf of his client. He was still using a superceded version in which ''personal information about'' had not been substituted for ''information relating to the personal affairs of'' (s41) - very different concepts in law. God only knows what his client was paying for a Silk's advice.

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Ombudsman's Managing unreasonable conduct practice manual

This is the "Managing unreasonable complaint conduct practice manual."

It is 70 pages written by the Ombudsman instructing staff how to deal with unreasonable conduct by people like myself who  understand that the Commonwealth Ombudsman  is failing its duties.

With over 40,000  complaints per year it could be reasonably expected that this Agency would realise that in many Government agencies that systemic corrupt is atrocious.

Unfortunately with the Commonwealth Ombudsman it fails to use its powers under the Ombudsman's Act and refer this to the relevant Government Minister.

It has become also apparent because of the lack of the responsibility of the Ombudsman, Government Agencies continue their atrocious conduct.

In most Government Agencies there is no investigation standards and no investigation policy.

In the Attorney Generals Department there is also no investigation standards or policy when complaints are made with substantial evidence.

In the Attorney Generals Annual Report 2011-2012 it clearly says “all complaints are investigated'

This is a false statement made by this department