Tuesday 31 December 2013

Abuse of Discretion

A failure to take into proper consideration the facts and law relating to a particular matter; an Arbitrary or unreasonable departure from precedent and settled judicial custom.
Where a trial court must exercise discretion in deciding a question, it must do so in a way that is not clearly against logic and the evidence. An improvident exercise of discretion is an error of law and grounds for reversing a decision on appeal. It does not, however, necessarily amount to bad faith, intentional wrong, or misconduct by the trial judge.
For example, the traditional standard of appellate review for evidence-related questions arising during trial is the "abuse of discretion" standard. Most judicial determinations are made based on evidence introduced at legal proceedings. Evidence may consist of oral testimony, written testimony, videotapes and sound recordings, documentary evidence such as exhibits and business records, and a host of other materials, including voice exemplars, handwriting samples, and blood tests.
Before such materials may be introduced into the record at a legal proceeding, the trial court must determine that they satisfy certain criteria governing the admissibility of evidence. At a minimum, the court must find that the evidence offered is relevant to the legal proceedings. Evidence that bears on a factual or legal issue at stake in a controversy is considered relevant evidence.
The relevancy of evidence is typically measured by its probative value. Evidence is generally deemed Probative if it has a tendency to make the existence of any material fact more or less probable. Evidence that a murder defendant ate spaghetti on the day of the murder might be relevant at trial if spaghetti sauce was found at the murder scene. Otherwise such evidence would probably be deemed irrelevant and could be excluded from trial if opposing counsel made the proper objection.
During many civil and criminal trials, judges rule on hundreds of evidentiary objections lodged by both parties. These rulings are normally snap judgments made in the heat of battle. Courts must make these decisions quickly to keep the proceedings moving on schedule. For this reason, judges are given wide latitude in making evidentiary rulings and will not be over-turned on appeal unless the appellate court finds that the trial judge abused his or her discretion.
For example, in a Negligence case, a state appellate court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence a posed accident-scene photograph, even though the photograph depicted a model pedestrian blindly walking into the path of the driver's vehicle with the pedestrian's head pointed straight ahead as if she was totally oblivious to the vehicle and other traffic. Gorman v. Hunt, 19 S.W.3d 662 (Ky. 2000). In upholding the trial court's decision to admit the evidence, the appellate court observed that the photograph was only used to show the pedestrian's position relative to the vehicle at the time of impact and not to blame the pedestrian for being negligent. The appellate court also noted that the lawyer objecting to the photograph's admissibility was free to remind the jury of its limited relevance during cross-examination and closing arguments.
An appellate court would find that a trial court abused its discretion, however, if it admitted into evidence a photograph without proof that it was authentic. Apter v. Ross, 781 N.E.2d 744 (Ind.App. 2003). A photograph's authenticity may be established by a witness's personal observations that the photograph accurately depicts what it purports to depict at the time the photograph was taken. Ordinarily the photographer who took the picture is in the best position to provide such testimony.

Further readings

Cohen, Ruth Bryna. 2000."Superior Court Affirms Non Pros for Failure to Subpoena Own Witness; Trial Court Did not Abuse Discretion in Its Application of Civil Procedure Rule 216." Pennsylvania Law Weekly (October 9).
Hamblett, Mark. 2001. "Circuit Panel Issues Recusal Guidelines; Says Rakoff Acted Properly In Not Stepping Down." New York Law Journal (February 26).
Riccardi, Michael A. 2002."Polygraph Evidence OK to Prove Probable Cause, Circuit Judges Say; No Abuse of Discretion in Relying on 'Lie Detector' for Limited Purpose." Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 29).

Cross-references

West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. Copyright 2008 The Gale Group, Inc. All rights reserved.
Ads by Google
Defamation Lawyer
Experienced Defamation Specialists 28 years experience in defamation
australian-defamation-lawyers.com.au

Saturday 28 December 2013

Reply to the Australian Government Solicitors



To
David Nguyen
Australian Government Solicitors
MLC Cente
Martin Place 2000

Dear Mr Nguyen
I respond to your letter dated 17th December 2013 where you intend to set my subpoena aside once again.
As I believe you must be of some intelligence I would recommend that you read the statements provided to the Australian Federal Police by Veronique Ingram , Adam Toma, Mathew Osborne Mark Findlay and Cheryl Cullen and you may come to your own ( even if it is limited ) conclusion why AFSA wants this subpoena set aside. Therefore it is the intention of the Australian Government Solicitor and AFSA to protect systemic corrupt conduct and I understand you are again asking a court and magistrate to comply with your request.

You also may feel obliged to inform your "ÇLIENTS'' of the consequences of perjury and the requirements of the Australian Public Service Code of conduct..........................
and may also feel obliged to inform Veronique Ingram of her obligation as a Government Agency Head and the responsibility this carries.
You are also aware I am not obligated in informing you how I intend to use the documents I have subpoenaed to use in my defence however you are clearly aware it relates to the systemic failure of senior Management at AFSA.
Thank You
Fiona Brown

Saturday 7 December 2013

Tasmanian Integrity Commission CEO Diane Merryfull

No integrity here from this shonky bitch  Merryfull worked for the Commonwealth Ombudsman where she protected Fraud and systemic corrupt conductTasmanian Integrity Commission CEO Diane Merryfull

.
Anyone wanting to testify against Veronique Ingram/ AFSA

If you have had difficulties with shonky Veronique Ingram Inspector General in Bankruptcy and  the systemic corrupt conduct this bitch is protecting at  the Australian Financial Security Authority or the old ITSA come and testify against  against her at the Downing Centre in Sydney...
Email me fionabrown01@hotmail.com if interested*****************

Friday 6 December 2013

 Complaints about AFSA/ ITSA/ Veronique Ingram / Matthew Osborne/ Mark Findlay
If you have  had problems with ITSA / AFSA and would like to have the matter heard before a magistrate in a court of Law please contact me
fionabrown01@hotmail.com
and have your say in court.
This matter is to expose systemic corrupt conduct and corruption!!!!
Particularly if you   have had dealings with any of the following.....
Veronique Ingram, shonkey Inspector General in Bankruptcy
Adam Toma EX corrupt National Enforcement Manager
Matthew Osborne principal Legal Officer providing corrupt legal Advice to Trustees
Mark Findlay 
Gavin McCosker
Cheryl Cullen
Florence Choo 
Guilia Inga
Also anyone who has experience difficulty with Tibor Karolyi who originally worked for ITSA/ AFSA and now works for  de Vries Tayeh

Thursday 5 December 2013

The Heiner Affair

Posted by: Gina Baker | 5 December, 2013 - 12:23 PM
Heiner Affair aka shreddergate still in the news after 18 years 4BC Mornings: Kevin Lindeberg is an ex Trade Union official. Twenty threre years ago he was involved in calling to account  members of the former Goss Government over the illegal shredding of documents relating to child abuse.
He joins Greg Cary to discuss the case then and now. Kevin is not satified that justice has been done and calls for a parliamentary Commission of Inquiry.

The Heiner Affair is the running sore of the Queensland justice system, - It is a chronic "cover up" having the dimensions of Nixon's "Watergate."
The ALP being a party top heavy with lawyers and barristers is totally aware of how Goss and Beattie have misrepresented sect129 of the Criminal code when it suits them.
Are ALL people equal before the law, - or are some people more equal than others???
It is way past time that the Augean Stables of Heiner were cleansed.
Les T. Kelly, Launceston, Tas.
Les T. Kelly Friday 6 December, 2013 - 9:36 AM 
WHISTLEBLOWER KEVIN LINDEBERG’S 8 AUGUST 2013 COMMENTARY RE POST-CARMODY INQUIRY’S 1 JULY 2013 FINDING OF PRIMA FACIE BREACH OF SECTION 129 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE RE SHREDDING OF THE HEINER INQUIRY DOCUMENTS AND TAPES

Whistleblower Kevin Lindeberg – Former public sector trade union organiser
Whistleblower Kevin Lindeberg – Former public sector trade union organiser
Q: ARE YOU SAYING THAT COMMISSIONER CARMODY’S NARROW DEFINITION OF ‘GOVERNMENT’ EVENTUALLY CAUGHT UP WITH HIM IN TERMS OF HIS FINDING OF A PRIMA FACIE CRIME BY THE LAW NOT BEING ABLE TO BE FULLY APPLIED?
KL: That’s correct. He said at the Recusal Hearing that if he defined the term “government” to mean “whole of government”, that is, departments and statutory authorities, then he would have to stand aside because it would logically mean that he’d have to investigate himself when he was the Queensland Crime Commissioner in 2001 when I saw him about the Harding Incident. He accepted that the law does not permit a party to an allegation to investigate himself.
In other words, after setting the parameters, he couldn’t apply the full scope of section 7 to the prima face shredding crime without breaching his own narrow definition of “government” to just mean “the political executive” because once the floodgates opened, it flooded everywhere and everything.
The Rofe QC Audit, to all intents and purposes, is the systemic cover-up flooding roadmap. Full commentary and interview here >>>>>

6  MAY  2013 - A  DAY  TO  REMEMBER

Commissioner Tim Carmody
Commissioner Tim Carmody
Some days are just like any other but some may be pivotal in the lives of individuals, for particular issues or nations because of what transpires. This can be judged either instantaneously, prospectively or retrospectively.
On 6 May 2013, in Court 17 of the Brisbane Magistrates Court Building, never before heard arguments as to whether an entire Cabinet may be in serious breach of the Criminal Code were live-streamed to the world on the internet.  Specifically, they addressed the extraordinary legal question as to whether the 5 March 1990 order by the Queensland Cabinet to destroy the Heiner Inquiry documents and tapes to, inter alia, reduce the risk of legal action may have been illegal.
Despite it being nearly a quarter of a century since this shredding order, its legal consequences remain alive because no statute of limitations applies.
Presiding over the arguments was Commissioner Tim Carmody SC, head of the Child Protection Commission of Inquiry. Full commentary here >>>>>

2012 SPECIAL COMMENTARY BY WHISTLEBLOWER KEVIN LINDEBERG

Whistleblower Kevin Lindeberg
Whistleblower Kevin Lindeberg

Over a long period this webpage has independently drawn together all material available on the public record which goes to making up what is now commonly known across Australia and around the world as “the Heiner Affair.”  The whistleblower, Kevin Lindeberg, is not responsible for its content although it contains most of what he has written about his public interest disclosures. He has never directly made a comment on this webpage.
However, due to recent dramatic events, he was approached with a series of relevant questions, and his response is now published here.>>>>> MOVING TOWARDS THE ENDGAME

Witness confirms pack rape of girl to Heiner Inquiry

John Oxley Youth Detention Centre
John Oxley Youth Detention Centre. Picture: Philip Norrish
Today at the Carmody Inquiry, the Rubicon on the Heiner Affair was irretrievable crossed.
A highly credible witness under oath, Mrs Irene Parfitt, former Youth Worker at the John Oxley Youth Detention Centre, confirmed the contents of her police statement that she told Mr Heiner about the pack rape of Annette Harding when she gave evidence to him in Brisbane Children's Court at North Quay.
She was, in effect, a whistleblower. She would not tolerate silence any longer over a burning issue at the Centre for many staff, and she believed the Heiner Inquiry was the place to make her public interest disclosure.  The assault was a matter which greatly disturbed her. Notwithstanding some time difficulties expected after the passage of close to 23 years, she clearly recalled telling Mr Heiner about the sexual assault of Ms Harding, a 14-year-old indigenous child while in the care of the State.
Full commentary here >>>>>

Should Commissioner Carmody Have Recused Himself from the QCPCI?

Alleged Prima Facie Criminal Count 57 of the Rofe Audit.

Commissioner Tim Carmody
Commissioner Tim Carmody
Section 87 of the Criminal Code - Official Corruption in regard to the conduct of certain officials of the Queensland Crime Commission in respect of their handling of the allegations by one Kevin Lindeberg and related matters at certain times-
That on divers dates between the thirteenth day of December 2001 and the thirty first day of December 2001, at Brisbane in the state of Queensland, one Timothy Carmody, to the extent of his involvement, being a holder of office in the Queensland Crime Commission, pursuant to the Crime Commission Act 1997, at material times, did corruptly confer an advantage on another in respect the handling of allegations by one Kevin Lindeberg by failing to act honestly, impartially and in the public interest.
You be the judge full account of Count 57 of the Rofe Audit here >>>>>


Queensland Parliamentry Crime and Misconduct Committee

Other heiner affair commentary.

Downloads

MP3/Video Interviews

Radio 4BC
Radio 4BC 01/10/2009
Radio 4BC 09/07/2010
Radio 2GB 30/09/2009
Radio 2GB 29/09/2009
Radio 2GB 24/06/2009
Radio 2GB 23/06/2009 Video
ABC Radio Richard Fidler Conversation Hour 17/03/2009
Brisbane radio 4BC 20/03/2009
Alan Jones radio interview with Piers Akerman.
Alan Jones radio interview with Peter Beattie
Alan Jones radio interview with former QLD union official Kevin Lindeberg

Download PDF Documents

Crime in the Community

Forde Commission of Inquiry

Inquiry into Harmonising Legal Systems

Tasmanian Parliament Joint Select Committee on Ethical Conduct

Standing Committee Legal & Constitutional Affairs

Independent Monthly

 

Wednesday 4 December 2013

What is needed to obtain a search Warrant

What is needed to obtain a search warrantLegislation

For the most part, legislative instruments do make an allowance for the issuing of search warrants when required, however, the majority of jurisdictions in Australia have specific laws dealing with the issuing of search warrants, and alternatively, legislation revolving around drug offences also have sections addressing how a search warrant is to be obtained.
Using a legislative example, we can look to s 465(1) of the Crimes Act of Victoria as our basis, regarding the issuing of search warrants:
“(1) Any magistrate who is satisfied by the evidence on oath or by affidavit of any member of the police force of or above the rank of senior sergeant that there is reasonable ground for believing that there is, or will be within the next 72 hours, in any building (including any vehicle in that building), receptacle or place (including any vehicle on or in that place) or on or in a particular vehicle located in a public place-
      (a)  anything upon or in respect of which any indictable offence has been or is suspected to have been committed or is being or is likely to be committed within the next 72 hours; or
      (b)  anything which there is reasonable ground to believe will afford evidence as to the commission of any such offence; or
      (c)  anything which there is reasonable ground to believe is intended to be used for the purpose of committing any indictable offence against the person for which the offender may be arrested without warrant-
may at any time issue a warrant authorizing some member of the police force or other person named therein to search such building receptacle, place or vehicle for any such thing and to seize and carry it before the Magistrates' Court to be dealt with according to law.”

What are some of the formal requirements in issuing a search warrant?

One of the interesting elements we should highlight in regards to s 465(1) in the Crimes Act of Victoria, is that the issuing justice must believe on reasonable grounds that a search warrant, is well, warranted.
The courts have recognised the sanctity of a person’s property and the decision to issue a search warrant should not be taken lightly, however, it also must be balanced with the relevance to the issue and in Crowley v Murphy, Lockhart J in the Federal Court said:
“This does not mean that the Justice must be satisfied that the things to be searched for will necessarily afford evidence sufficient to result in a conviction; but simply whether they will be relevant in some way to the issue, if found. He is not to decide the case at the time it is sought to issue the warrant; but the Justice must remember that he is exercising wide powers ex parte, and must take into account the rights of the citizen who is not before him in a proceeding that cuts across the ancient principle that a person's home is inviolable. It is a power to be exercised with great care and circumspection. The warrant is not to be lightly granted.”
Because a person’s property rights are sacrosanct, when a justice makes the decision to issue a search warrant they are expected to comply with the legal and procedural formalities or the warrant may be invalid, such as the case in R v Macleod, in which Slicer J of the Tasmanian Supreme Court stated, that the trial judge erred in applying the wrong test: which was to be satisfied with the material at hand that would give rise to reasonable grounds for suspicion. It’s not enough that the issuing justice is satisfied, that the person seeking a search warrant is satisfied.

The offence must be fairly stated in the warrant

The recurring theme of this article is the issuing of a warrant must be done on reasonable grounds because a person’s home and property should be free from intrusion. Because of the high regard in which a person’s property rights are held, a search warrant must contain sufficient particulars so an officer, as well as a citizen, is able to consider whether particular things have relevance. In Beneficial Finance v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police, Burchett J in the Federal Court of Australia said:
“The purpose of the statement of the offence in the warrant is not to define the issues for trial; but to set bounds to the area of search which the execution of the warrant will involve, as part of an investigation into a suspected crime. The appropriate contrast is not with the sort of error which might vitiate an indictment, but with the failure to focus the statutory suspicion and belief upon any particular crime, with the result that a condition of the issue of warrant is not fulfilled, and it purports to be a general warrant of the kind the law decisively rejected in the 18th century. There should be no going back on that rejection, which is an essential bulwark of respect for the integrity and liberties of the individual in a free society, but what the rule requires is identification (and so limitation) of an area of search by reference to a suspected offence, not the formulation of a pleading before the offence is capable of prosecution.”

What if police find something relating to another crime when executing a warrant?

In R v Applebee, Higgins J stated, that when the police are conducting a search it must be confined, “…in kind and scope to that which is necessary to find the “things” for which the search is authorised.” His Honour came to the conclusion that the search and seizure beyond finding the necessary and authorised “things”, was not lawful in that particular instance.

Share

Read more related articles


Search Warrants/ when search warrants can be issued


Commonwealth Consolidated Acts

[Index] [Table] [Search] [Search this Act] [Notes] [Noteup] [Previous] [Next] [Download] [Help]

CRIMES ACT 1914 - SECT 3E

When search warrants can be issued
             (1)  An issuing officer may issue a warrant to search premises if the officer is satisfied, by information on oath or affirmation, that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is, or there will be within the next 72 hours, any evidential material at the premises.
             (2)  An issuing officer may issue a warrant authorising an ordinary search or a frisk search of a person if the officer is satisfied, by information on oath or affirmation, that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person has in his or her possession, or will within the next 72 hours have in his or her possession, any evidential material.
             (3)  If the person applying for the warrant suspects that, in executing the warrant, it will be necessary to use firearms, the person must state that suspicion, and the grounds for that suspicion, in the information.
             (4)  If the person applying for the warrant is a member or special member of the Australian Federal Police and has, at any time previously, applied for a warrant relating to the same person or premises the person must state particulars of those applications and their outcome in the information.
             (5)  If an issuing officer issues a warrant, the officer is to state in the warrant:
                     (a)  the offence to which the warrant relates; and
                     (b)  a description of the premises to which the warrant relates or the name or description of the person to whom it relates; and
                     (c)  the kinds of evidential material that are to be searched for under the warrant; and
                     (d)  the name of the constable who, unless he or she inserts the name of another constable in the warrant, is to be responsible for executing the warrant; and
                     (e)  the time at which the warrant expires (see subsection (5A)); and
                      (f)  whether the warrant may be executed at any time or only during particular hours.
          (5A)  The time stated in the warrant under paragraph 3E(5)(e) as the time at which the warrant expires must be a time that is not later than the end of the seventh day after the day on which the warrant is issued.
Example:    If a warrant is issued at 3 pm on a Monday, the expiry time specified must not be later than midnight on Monday in the following week.
             (6)  The issuing officer is also to state, in a warrant in relation to premises:
                     (a)  that the warrant authorises the seizure of a thing (other than evidential material of the kind referred to in paragraph (5)(c)) found at the premises in the course of the search that the executing officer or a constable assisting believes on reasonable grounds to be:
                              (i)  evidential material in relation to an offence to which the warrant relates; or
                             (ii)  a thing relevant to another offence that is an indictable offence; or
                            (iii)  evidential material (within the meaning of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 ) or tainted property (within the meaning of that Act);
                            if the executing officer or a constable assisting believes on reasonable grounds that seizure of the thing is necessary to prevent its concealment, loss or destruction or its use in committing an offence; and
                     (b)  whether the warrant authorises an ordinary search or a frisk search of a person who is at or near the premises when the warrant is executed if the executing officer or a constable assisting suspects on reasonable grounds that the person has any evidential material or seizable items in his or her possession.
             (7)  The issuing officer is also to state, in a warrant in relation to a person:
                     (a)  that the warrant authorises the seizure of a thing (other than evidential material of the kind referred to in paragraph (5)(c)) found, in the course of the search, on or in the possession of the person or in a recently used conveyance, being a thing that the executing officer or a constable assisting believes on reasonable grounds to be:
                              (i)  evidential material in relation to an offence to which the warrant relates; or
                             (ii)  a thing relevant to another offence that is an indictable offence; or
                            (iii)  evidential material (within the meaning of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 ) or tainted property (within the meaning of that Act);
                            if the executing officer or a constable assisting believes on reasonable grounds that seizure of the thing is necessary to prevent its concealment, loss or destruction or its use in committing an offence; and
                     (b)  the kind of search of a person that the warrant authorises.
             (8)  Paragraph (5)(e) and subsection (5A) do not prevent the issue of successive warrants in relation to the same premises or person.
             (9)  If the application for the warrant is made under section 3R, this section (other than subsection (5A)) applies as if:
                     (a)  subsections (1) and (2) referred to 48 hours rather than 72 hours; and
                     (b)  paragraph (5)(e) required the issuing officer to state in the warrant the period for which the warrant is to remain in force, which must not be more than 48 hours.
           (10)  An issuing officer in New South Wales or the Australian Capital Territory may issue a warrant in relation to premises or a person in the Jervis Bay Territory.
           (11)  An issuing officer in a State or internal Territory may:
                     (a)  issue a warrant in relation to premises or a person in that State or Territory; or
                     (b)  issue a warrant in relation to premises or a person in an external Territory; or
                     (c)  issue a warrant in relation to premises or a person in another State or internal Territory (including the Jervis Bay Territory) if he or she is satisfied that there are special circumstances that make the issue of the warrant appropriate; or
                     (d)  issue a warrant in relation to a person wherever the person is in Australia or in an external Territory if he or she is satisfied that it is not possible to predict where the person may be.


AustLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback

Tuesday 3 December 2013

Bernard Collaery./ East Timor
IT is not too hard to look ahead and see who is going to have the last laugh on this one!!!!!!!!!!!!!
It is a requirement that material seized in a search warrant must be used in a ciminal case in a court of Law.
By the shonky George Brandis ordering a raid on the Offices and home of Bernard Collaery a solicitor who only was representing East Timor Government in the Hague and exposing corrupt Federal Government spy agencies the matter is required to proceed to court.
Looks like it will provide great entertainment for all when the shonky " spies "are exposed.
Clearly search warrants are the preferred method of intimidation for Government Agencies who are attempting to protect Corrupt Conduct and corruption!!!



ASIO officers have allegedly detained a man and raided the office of a lawyer who claims that Australian spies bugged the cabinet room of East Timor's government during negotiations over oil and gas deposits.
Attorney-General George Brandis confirmed last night that he had issued a search warrant for a Canberra address and that ASIO had executed it, seizing a number of documents "on the grounds that [they] contained intelligence related to security matters".
Office raided: Bernard Collaery. Office raided: Bernard Collaery. Photo: Supplied
The current director general of ASIO, David Irvine, was head of ASIS when the alleged bugging operation against East Timor took place.
Advertisement
Lawyer Bernard Collaery is representing the East Timorese government in the Hague as it seeks arbitration over a treaty it signed with Australia over the lucrative deposits, which it has since declared invalid.
East Timor, also known as Timor Leste, will tender evidence of the eavesdropping as part of its case.
Mr Collaery, who has just arrived in the Hague, told Fairfax Media the raids were a "disgrace". He said the man ASIO had detained in Australia was a whistleblower who had led the Australian Secret Intelligence Serice operation to bug the cabinet room in East Timor.
"How dare they," Mr Collaery said. "These tactics are designed to intimidate the witness and others from coming forward. It's designed to cover up an illegal operation in 2004 by ASIS."
But Mr Brandis said the allegation that the raid was intended to affect or impede the arbitration at The Hague was wrong.
"I have instructed ASIO that the material taken into possession is not under any circumstances to be communicated to those conducting those proceedings on behalf of Australia," he said.
Prime Minister Tony Abbott said: ''We don't interfere in cases, but we always act to ensure that our national security is being properly upheld.''
''That's what we're doing.''
The Greens on Wednesday called on Senator Brandis to give a full explanation as to why he authorised raids, with Greens MP Adam Bandt saying he was disturbed by the news.
''If it is true it seems that George Brandis seems to think he's J. Edgar Hoover and is able to throw warrants around like confetti,'' Mr Bandt said.
Senator Brandis needed to give a ''full explanation'' for the raids, he said.
Labor frontbencher Richard Marles cautioned all those ''who have been in government and those who are in government'' not to comment on the raids, saying it would undermine Australia's national security.
''It doesn't help anyone to be walking down the path of pulling apart and commenting on these intelligence matters,'' he told Sky News on Wednesday.
But his Labor colleague Kelvin Thomson said he was troubled by both the spying allegations and Wednesday's ASIO raids, questioning how East Timor could be considered a national security threat.
East Timor alleges that former foreign minister Alexander Downer dispatched a team of ASIS officers to East Timor's capital, Dili, to bug the government's cabinet room and Prime Minister's office in 2004.
The alleged incursion was a breach of international law and Timorese sovereignty, Mr Collaery added. It was not properly authorised and amounted to a criminal conspiracy.
At the time of the alleged ASIS operation, the two countries were negotiating a treaty covering the Greater Sunrise oil and gas deposits, worth many billions of dollars and the fledgling country's major source of revenue.
Mr Collaery told Fairfax Media the whisteblower had been in charge of the operation for ASIS.
"We have irrefutable evidence from the person who was in charge of the operation," he said. "This is not a maverick whistleblower like Edward Snowden."
Mr Collarey added he had the evidence of eavesdropping with him in the Hague.
He said his office in Canberra was raided by two men who identified themselves as ASIO agents but refused to show their search warrant, citing national security.
The officers, he said, seized documents and electronic files.
Mr Collaery, a former ACT attorney-general, said he had been unable to contact the whistleblower but believed he was still being detained at his house and questioned late Tuesday.
ASIO declined to comment.
Mr Collaery said the alleged ASIO action was unprecedented, but would not derail his case.
The negotiations over the Greater Sunrise were tense and Mr Downer was eventually forced to give East Timor a greater share of the deposits after public outrage here and in East Timor.
But resentment lingered in East Timor that it had come off second best.
As it sought to renegotiate the treaty, the East Timorese government informed then prime minister Julia Gillard of the alleged bugging by ASIS.
"We offered Gillard the opportunity to tear the treaty up and renegotiate it, but she refused," Mr Collarey said.
After her refusal to do so earlier this year, East Timor went public with the espionage allegations, declared the treaty – formally known as the Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS) – invalid and took it to The Hague for arbitration.
.collaery-over-east-timor-spy-claim-20131203-2yoxq.html#ixzz2mTnNWeMl
Veronique Ingram , Adam Toma, Mark Findlay Matthew Osborne, Adam Toma Gavin McCosker/ Cheryl Cullen ITSA/ AFSA

Anyone who wishes to give evidence against any of the shonky senior Management of ITSA/ AFSA   named above please contact me.
 The trial will go ahead   sometime next year and I have asked the magistrate for 3 to 4 week with all of the above lining up to be cross examined.
If this shonky Government Agency has fucked you over  have your say and give evidence in court.
Although Senator Williams has a half hearted attempt at ITSA/ AFSA it clearly appears that it will be left to me to expose  systemic Corrupt conduct in this Government Department.
Contact me fionabrown01@hotmail.com and get in the list to expose them!!!!!!!!!!!!!....
Should be great entertainment for those  who enjoy seeing shonky Public Servants  squirm........................
 and what will become of the Corrupt Adam Toma who was National Manager Enforcement ITSA and slipped out the back door and thought he was going to make a fresh start at Victoria Commission Gaming and Liquor Regulation....... this is a message for you...... you can run but you can't hide from me......... see you in Court!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!


Monday 25 November 2013

             (1)  A fault element for a particular physical element may be intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence.
             (2)  Subsection (1) does not prevent a law that creates a particular offence from specifying other fault elements for a physical element of that offence.
             (1)  A person has intention with respect to conduct if he or she means to engage in that conduct.
             (2)  A person has intention with respect to a circumstance if he or she believes that it exists or will exist.
             (3)  A person has intention with respect to a result if he or she means to bring it about or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.
                   A person has knowledge of a circumstance or a result if he or she is aware that it exists or will exist in the ordinary course of events.
             (1)  A person is reckless with respect to a circumstance if:
                     (a)  he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the circumstance exists or will exist; and
                     (b)  having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take the risk.
             (2)  A person is reckless with respect to a result if:
                     (a)  he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the result will occur; and
                     (b)  having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take the risk.
             (3)  The question whether taking a risk is unjustifiable is one of fact.
             (4)  If recklessness is  a fault element for a physical element of an offence, proof of intention, knowledge or recklessness will satisfy that fault element.
                   A person is negligent with respect to a physical element of an offence if his or her conduct involves:
                     (a)  such a great falling short of the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the circumstances; and
                     (b)  such a high risk that the physical element exists or will exist;
that the conduct merits criminal punishment for the offence.
             (1)  If the law creating the offence does not specify a fault element for a physical element that consists only of conduct, intention is the fault element for that physical element.
             (2)  If the law creating the offence does not specify a fault element for a physical element that consists of a circumstance or a result, recklessness is the fault element for that physical element.
Note:          Under subsection 5.4(4), recklessness can be established by proving intention, knowledge or recklessness.

474.17 Using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence

(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:

(a) the person uses a carriage service; and

(b) the person does so in a way (whether by the method of use or

the content of a communication, or both) that reasonable

persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances,

menacing, harassing or offensive.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years

It should be noted that it is a requirement that in all circumstances that a reasonable person would find it offensive. Clearly the Australian Federal Police find that in all cicumstances that systemic corrupt conduct should be protected



473.4 Determining whether material is offensive


The matters to be taken into account in deciding for the purposes of


this Part whether reasonable persons would regard particular


material, or a particular use of a carriage service, as being, in all


the circumstances, offensive, include:


(a) the standards of morality, decency and propriety generally


accepted by reasonable adults; and


(b) the literary, artistic or educational merit (if any) of the


material; and


(c) the general character of the material (including whether it is


of a medical, legal or scientific character
Also to obtain a guilty verdict the CDPP and the AFP who have been asked by Veronique Ingram to protect systemic corrupt conduct must satisfy intent as outlined in the schedule

CRIMINAL CODE ACT 1995 - SCHEDULE The

Criminal Code











The only offences against laws of the Commonwealth are those offences created by, or under the authority of, this Code or any other Act.


Note: Under subsection 38(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 , Act means an Act passed by the Parliament of the Commonwealth.










The purpose of this Chapter is to codify the general principles of criminal responsibility under laws of the Commonwealth. It contains all the general principles of criminal responsibility that apply to any offence, irrespective of how the offence is created.




(1) This Chapter applies to all offences against this Code.


(2) Subject to section 2.3, this Chapter applies on and after 15 December 2001 to all other offences.


(3) Section 11.6 applies to all offences.




Subsections 4.2(6) and (7) and Division 8 apply to all offences. For the purpose of interpreting those provisions in connection with an offence, the other provisions of this Chapter may be considered, whether or not those other provisions apply to the offence concerned.








(1) An offence consists of physical elements and fault elements.


(2) However, the law that creates the offence may provide that there is no fault element for one or more physical elements.


(3) The law that creates the offence may provide different fault elements for different physical elements.




In order for a person to be found guilty of committing an offence the following must be proved:


(a) the existence of such physical elements as are, under the law creating the offence, relevant to establishing guilt;


(b) in respect of each such physical element for which a fault element is required, one of the fault elements for the physical element.


Note 1: See Part 2.6 on proof of criminal responsibility.


Note 2: See Part 2.7 on geographical jurisdiction.






(1) A physical element of an offence may be:


(a) conduct; or


(b) a result of conduct; or


(c) a circumstance in which conduct, or a result of conduct, occurs.


(2) In this Code:


"conduct" means an act, an omission to perform an act or a state of affairs.


"engage in conduct" means:


(a) do an act; or


(b) omit to perform an act.




(1) Conduct can only be a physical element if it is voluntary.


(2) Conduct is only voluntary if it is a product of the will of the person whose conduct it is.


(3) The following are examples of conduct that is not voluntary:


(a) a spasm, convulsion or other unwilled bodily movement;


(b) an act performed during sleep or unconsciousness;


(c) an act performed during impaired consciousness depriving the person of the will to act.


(4) An omission to perform an act is only voluntary if the act omitted is one which the person is capable of performing.


(5) If the conduct constituting an offence consists only of a state of affairs, the state of affairs is only voluntary if it is one over which the person is capable of exercising control.


(6) Evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered in determining whether conduct is voluntary.


(7) Intoxication is self-induced unless it came about:


(a) involuntarily; or


(b) as a result of fraud, sudden or extraordinary emergency, accident, reasonable mistake, duress or force.




An omission to perform an act can only be a physical element if:


(a) the law creating the offence makes it so; or


(b) the law creating the offence impliedly provides that the offence is committed by an omission to perform an act that there is a duty to perform by a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, or at common law.






(1) A fault element for a particular physical element may be intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence.


(2) Subsection (1) does not prevent a law that creates a particular offence from specifying other fault elements for a physical element of that offence.




(1) A person has intention with respect to conduct if he or she means to engage in that conduct.


(2) A person has intention with respect to a circumstance if he or she believes that it exists or will exist.


(3) A person has intention with respect to a result if he or she means to bring it about or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.




A person has knowledge of a circumstance or a result if he or she is aware that it exists or will exist in the ordinary course of events.




(1) A person is reckless with respect to a circumstance if:


(a) he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the circumstance exists or will exist; and


(b) having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take the risk.


(2) A person is reckless with respect to a result if:


(a) he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the result will occur; and


(b) having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take the risk.


(3) The question whether taking a risk is unjustifiable is one of fact.


(4) If recklessness is a fault element for a physical element of an offence, proof of intention, knowledge or recklessness will satisfy that fault element.




A person is negligent with respect to a physical element of an offence if his or her conduct involves:


(a) such a great falling short of the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the circumstances; and


(b) such a high risk that the physical element exists or will exist;


that the conduct merits criminal punishment for the offence.




(1) If the law creating the offence does not specify a fault element for a physical element that consists only of conduct, intention is the fault element for that physical element.


(2) If the law creating the offence does not specify a fault element for a physical element that consists of a circumstance or a result, recklessness is the fault element for that physical element.


Note: Under subsection 5.4(4), recklessness can be established by proving intention, knowledge or recklessness.






(1) If a law that creates an offence provides that the offence is an offence of strict liability:


(a) there are no fault elements for any of the physical elements of the offence; and


(b) the defence of mistake of fact under section 9.2 is available.


(2) If a law that creates an offence provides that strict liability applies to a particular physical element of the offence:


(a) there are no fault elements for that physical element; and


(b) the defence of mistake of fact under section 9.2 is available in relation to that physical element.


(3) The existence of strict liability does not make any other defence unavailable.




(1) If a law that creates an offence provides that the offence is an offence of absolute liability:


(a) there are no fault elements for any of the physical elements of the offence; and


(b) the defence of mistake of fact under section 9.2 is unavailable.


(2) If a law that creates an offence provides that absolute liability applies to a particular physical element of the offence:


(a) there are no fault elements for that physical element; and


(b) the defence of mistake of fact under section 9.2 is unavailable in relation to that physical element.


(3) The existence of absolute liability does not make any other defence unavailable.




Note: This Part sets out defences that are generally available. Defences that apply to a more limited class of offences are dealt with elsewhere in this Code and in other laws.






A child under 10 years old is not criminally responsible for an offence.




(1) A child aged 10 years or more but under 14 years old can only be criminally responsible for an offence if the child knows that his or her conduct is wrong.


(2) The question whether a child knows that his or her conduct is wrong is one of fact. The burden of proving this is on the prosecution.




(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if, at the time of carrying out the conduct constituting the offence, the person was suffering from a mental impairment that had the effect that:


(a) the person did not know the nature and quality of the conduct; or


(b) the person did not know that the conduct was wrong (that is, the person could not reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure about whether the conduct, as perceived by reasonable people, was wrong); or


(c) the person was unable to control the conduct.


(2) The question whether the person was suffering from a mental impairment is one of fact.


(3) A person is presumed not to have been suffering from such a mental impairment. The presumption is only displaced if it is proved on the balance of probabilities (by the prosecution or the defence) that the person was suffering from such a mental impairment.


(4) The prosecution can only rely on this section if the court gives leave.


(5) The tribunal of fact must return a special verdict that a person is not guilty of an offence because of mental impairment if and only if it is satisfied that the person is not criminally responsible for the offence only because of a mental impairment.


(6) A person cannot rely on a mental impairment to deny voluntariness or the existence of a fault element but may rely on this section to deny criminal responsibility.


(7) If the tribunal of fact is satisfied that a person carried out conduct as a result of a delusion caused by a mental impairment, the delusion cannot otherwise be relied on as a defence.


(8) In this Code:


"mental impairment" includes senility, intellectual disability, mental illness, brain damage and severe personality disorder.


(9) The reference in subsection (8) to mental illness is a reference to an underlying pathological infirmity of the mind, whether of long or short duration and whether permanent or temporary, but does not include a condition that results from the reaction of a healthy mind to extraordinary external stimuli. However, such a condition may be evidence of a mental illness if it involves some abnormality and is prone to recur.






For the purposes of this Division, intoxication is self-induced unless it came about:


(a) involuntarily; or


(b) as a result of fraud, sudden or extraordinary emergency, accident, reasonable mistake, duress or force.




(1) Evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered in determining whether a fault element of basic intent existed.


(2) A fault element of basic intent is a fault element of intention for a physical element that consists only of conduct.


Note: A fault element of intention with respect to a circumstance or with respect to a result is not a fault element of basic intent.


(3) This section does not prevent evidence of self-induced intoxication being taken into consideration in determining whether conduct was accidental.


(4) This section does not prevent evidence of self-induced intoxication being taken into consideration in determining whether a person had a mistaken belief about facts if the person had considered whether or not the facts existed.


(5) A person may be regarded as having considered whether or not facts existed if:


(a) he or she had considered, on a previous occasion, whether those facts existed in circumstances surrounding that occasion; and


(b) he or she honestly and reasonably believed that the circumstances surrounding the present occasion were the same, or substantially the same, as those surrounding the previous occasion.




(1) If negligence is a fault element for a particular physical element of an offence, in determining whether that fault element existed in relation to a person who is intoxicated, regard must be had to the standard of a reasonable person who is not intoxicated.


(2) However, if intoxication is not self-induced, regard must be had to the standard of a reasonable person intoxicated to the same extent as the person concerned.




(1) If any part of a defence is based on actual knowledge or belief, evidence of intoxication may be considered in determining whether that knowledge or belief existed.


(2) If any part of a defence is based on reasonable belief, in determining whether that reasonable belief existed, regard must be had to the standard of a reasonable person who is not intoxicated.


(3) If a person's intoxication is not self-induced, in determining whether any part of a defence based on reasonable belief exists, regard must be had to the standard of a reasonable person intoxicated to the same extent as the person concerned.


(4) If, in relation to an offence:


(a) each physical element has a fault element of basic intent; and


(b) any part of a defence is based on actual knowledge or belief;


evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered in determining whether that knowledge or belief existed.


(5) A fault element of basic intent is a fault element of intention for a physical element that consists only of conduct.


Note: A fault element of intention with respect to a circumstance or with respect to a result is not a fault element of basic intent.




A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if the person's conduct constituting the offence was as a result of intoxication that was not self-induced.






(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence that has a physical element for which there is a fault element other than negligence if:


(a) at the time of the conduct constituting the physical element, the person is under a mistaken belief about, or is ignorant of, facts; and


(b) the existence of that mistaken belief or ignorance negates any fault element applying to that physical element.


(2) In determining whether a person was under a mistaken belief about, or was ignorant of, facts, the tribunal of fact may consider whether the mistaken belief or ignorance was reasonable in the circumstances.




(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence that has a physical element for which there is no fault element if:


(a) at or before the time of the conduct constituting the physical element, the person considered whether or not facts existed, and is under a mistaken but reasonable belief about those facts; and


(b) had those facts existed, the conduct would not have constituted an offence.


(2) A person may be regarded as having considered whether or not facts existed if:


(a) he or she had considered, on a previous occasion, whether those facts existed in the circumstances surrounding that occasion; and


(b) he or she honestly and reasonably believed that the circumstances surrounding the present occasion were the same, or substantially the same, as those surrounding the previous occasion.


Note: Section 6.2 prevents this section applying in situations of absolute liability.




(1) A person can be criminally responsible for an offence even if, at the time of the conduct constituting the offence, he or she is mistaken about, or ignorant of, the existence or content of an Act that directly or indirectly creates the offence or directly or indirectly affects the scope or operation of the offence.


(2) Subsection (1) does not apply, and the person is not criminally responsible for the offence in those circumstances, if the Act is expressly to the contrary effect.




(1) A person can be criminally responsible for an offence even if, at the time of the conduct constituting the offence, he or she is mistaken about, or ignorant of, the existence or content of the subordinate legislation that directly or indirectly creates the offence or directly or indirectly affects the scope or operation of the offence.


(2) Subsection (1) does not apply, and the person is not criminally responsible for the offence in those circumstances, if:


(a) the subordinate legislation is expressly to the contrary effect; or


(c) at the time of the conduct, the subordinate legislation:


(i) has not been made available to the public (by means of the Register under the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 or otherwise); and


(ii) has not otherwise been made available to persons likely to be affected by it in such a way that the person would have become aware of its contents by exercising due diligence.


(3) In this section:


"available" includes available by sale.


"subordinate legislation" means an instrument of a legislative character made directly or indirectly under an Act, or in force directly or indirectly under an Act.




(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence that has a physical element relating to property if:


(a) at the time of the conduct constituting the offence, the person is under a mistaken belief about a proprietary or possessory right; and


(b) the existence of that right would negate a fault element for any physical element of the offence.


(2) A person is not criminally responsible for any other offence arising necessarily out of the exercise of the proprietary or possessory right that he or she mistakenly believes to exist.


(3) This section does not negate criminal responsibility for an offence relating to the use of force against a person.






A person is not criminally responsible for an offence that has a physical element to which absolute liability or strict liability applies if:


(a) the physical element is brought about by another person over whom the person has no control or by a non-human act or event over which the person has no control; and


(b) the person could not reasonably be expected to guard against the bringing about of that physical element.




(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if he or she carries out the conduct constituting the offence under duress.


(2) A person carries out conduct under duress if and only if he or she reasonably believes that:


(a) a threat has been made that will be carried out unless an offence is committed; and


(b) there is no reasonable way that the threat can be rendered ineffective; and


(c) the conduct is a reasonable response to the threat.


(3) This section does not apply if the threat is made by or on behalf of a person with whom the person under duress is voluntarily associating for the purpose of carrying out conduct of the kind actually carried out.




(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if he or she carries out the conduct constituting the offence in response to circumstances of sudden or extraordinary emergency.


(2) This section applies if and only if the person carrying out the conduct reasonably believes that:


(a) circumstances of sudden or extraordinary emergency exist; and


(b) committing the offence is the only reasonable way to deal with the emergency; and


(c) the conduct is a reasonable response to the emergency.




(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if he or she carries out the conduct constituting the offence in self-defence.


(2) A person carries out conduct in self-defence if and only if he or she believes the conduct is necessary:


(a) to defend himself or herself or another person; or


(b) to prevent or terminate the unlawful imprisonment of himself or herself or another person; or


(c) to protect property from unlawful appropriation, destruction, damage or interference; or


(d) to prevent criminal trespass to any land or premises; or


(e) to remove from any land or premises a person who is committing criminal trespass;


and the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she perceives them.


(3) This section does not apply if the person uses force that involves the intentional infliction of death or really serious injury:


(a) to protect property; or


(b) to prevent criminal trespass; or


(c) to remove a person who is committing criminal trespass.


(4) This section does not apply if:


(a) the person is responding to lawful conduct; and


(b) he or she knew that the conduct was lawful.


However, conduct is not lawful merely because the person carrying it out is not criminally responsible for it.




A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if the conduct constituting the offence is justified or excused by or under a law.








(1) A person who attempts to commit an offence is guilty of the offence of attempting to commit that offence and is punishable as if the offence attempted had been committed.


(2) For the person to be guilty, the person's conduct must be more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence. The question whether conduct is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence is one of fact.


(3) For the offence of attempting to commit an offence, intention and knowledge are fault elements in relation to each physical element of the offence attempted.


Note: Under section 3.2, only one of the fault elements of intention or knowledge would need to be established in respect of each physical element of the offence attempted.


(3A) Subsection (3) has effect subject to subsection (6A).


(4) A person may be found guilty even if:


(a) committing the offence attempted is impossible; or


(b) the person actually committed the offence attempted.


(5) A person who is found guilty of attempting to commit an offence cannot be subsequently charged with the completed offence.


(6) Any defences, procedures, limitations or qualifying provisions that apply to an offence apply also to the offence of attempting to commit that offence.


(6A) Any special liability provisions that apply to an offence apply also to the offence of attempting to commit that offence.


(7) It is not an offence to attempt to commit an offence against section 11.2 (complicity and common purpose), section 11.2A (joint commission), section 11.3 (commission by proxy), section 11.5 (conspiracy to commit an offence) or section 135.4 (conspiracy to defraud).




(1) A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence by another person is taken to have committed that offence and is punishable accordingly.


(2) For the person to be guilty:


(a) the person's conduct must have in fact aided, abetted, counselled or procured the commission of the offence by the other person; and


(b) the offence must have been committed by the other person.


(3) For the person to be guilty, the person must have intended that:


(a) his or her conduct would aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of any offence (including its fault elements) of the type the other person committed; or


(b) his or her conduct would aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of an offence and have been reckless about the commission of the offence (including its fault elements) that the other person in fact committed.


(3A) Subsection (3) has effect subject to subsection (6).


(4) A person cannot be found guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence if, before the offence was committed, the person:


(a) terminated his or her involvement; and


(b) took all reasonable steps to prevent the commission of the offence.


(5) A person may be found guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence even if the other person has not been prosecuted or has not been found guilty.


(6) Any special liability provisions that apply to an offence apply also for the purposes of determining whether a person is guilty of that offence because of the operation of subsection (1).


(7) If the trier of fact is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a person either:


(a) is guilty of a particular offence otherwise than because of the operation of subsection (1); or


(b) is guilty of that offence because of the operation of subsection (1);


but is not able to determine which, the trier of fact may nonetheless find the person guilty of that offence.




Joint commission


(1) If:


(a) a person and at least one other party enter into an agreement to commit an offence; and


(b) either:


(i) an offence is committed in accordance with the agreement (within the meaning of subsection (2)); or


(ii) an offence is committed in the course of carrying out the agreement (within the meaning of subsection (3));


the person is taken to have committed the joint offence referred to in whichever of subsection (2) or (3) applies and is punishable accordingly.


Offence committed in accordance with the agreement


(2) An offence is committed in accordance with the agreement if:


(a) the conduct of one or more parties in accordance with the agreement makes up the physical elements consisting of conduct of an offence (the joint offence ) of the same type as the offence agreed to; and


(b) to the extent that a physical element of the joint offence consists of a result of conduct--that result arises from the conduct engaged in; and


(c) to the extent that a physical element of the joint offence consists of a circumstance--the conduct engaged in, or a result of the conduct engaged in, occurs in that circumstance.


Offence committed in the course of carrying out the agreement


(3) An offence is committed in the course of carrying out the agreement if the person is reckless about the commission of an offence (the joint offence ) that another party in fact commits in the course of carrying out the agreement.


Intention to commit an offence


(4) For a person to be guilty of an offence because of the operation of this section, the person and at least one other party to the agreement must have intended that an offence would be committed under the agreement.


Agreement may be non-verbal etc.


(5) The agreement:


(a) may consist of a non-verbal understanding; and


(b) may be entered into before, or at the same time as, the conduct constituting any of the physical elements of the joint offence was engaged in.


Termination of involvement etc.


(6) A person cannot be found guilty of an offence because of the operation of this section if, before the conduct constituting any of the physical elements of the joint offence concerned was engaged in, the person:


(a) terminated his or her involvement; and


(b) took all reasonable steps to prevent that conduct from being engaged in.


Person may be found guilty even if another party not prosecuted etc.


(7) A person may be found guilty of an offence because of the operation of this section even if:


(a) another party to the agreement has not been prosecuted or has not been found guilty; or


(b) the person was not present when any of the conduct constituting the physical elements of the joint offence was engaged in.


Special liability provisions apply


(8) Any special liability provisions that apply to the joint offence apply also for the purposes of determining whether a person is guilty of that offence because of the operation of this section.